


Whilst I’m sure that the entire SCN system is managed to suitably high pseudo-safety-critical standards within the Design Organisation (i.e.
.jpg)
That is in all cases except Eurofighter Typhoon where partitioning was done to meet political workshare agreements. What they do want to do however is ensure that Blue Ray player type X will work with Controller Y and Screens Z – and that if the controller needs to also work with a particular comms system then it can be coded accordingly.įor that reason a lot of time and effort is put into partitioning functionality such that the (re)qualification impact of in-service design changes can be minimised. Those elements of code and equipment will be partitioned away such that the remainder of the vehicle can be changed/update/reconfigured as required without requiring the entire vehicle to be re-qualified.Ī simple analogy being that Airbus don’t want a change to the In Flight Entertainment system to require them to re-qualify the Flight Control System software. Yes, certain functionality in some ECUs is definitely and inescapably safety critical and will be designed and written to the equivalent of DO-178B Level B/C (think of the consequences of cruise control going rogue, or separation radar getting its decimal point in the wrong place).

I fully agree with the point about the potential for misconfiguration and unreliability, but as someone who has worked in driverless vehicles and aviation all my working life, I think that it’s slightly emotive to justify some of M-B’s behavior on the grounds of safety. This post contains five parts: SCN system definition and importance SCN coding importance SCN coding compatible hardware SCN connect c4 how to use SCN connect c4 to do SCN coding case study on SCN connect c4 perform do SCN coding.
